











































Model-Based Contract Design for Low Energy Waste Heat
Contracts: The Route to Pricing
Citation for published version:
Wheatcroft, E, Wynn, HP, Volodina, V, Dent, CJ & Lygnerud, K 2021, 'Model-Based Contract Design for
Low Energy Waste Heat Contracts: The Route to Pricing', Energies, vol. 14, no. 12, 3614.
https://doi.org/10.3390/en14123614
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3390/en14123614
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. Jul. 2021
energies
Article
Model-Based Contract Design for Low Energy Waste Heat
Contracts: The Route to Pricing
Edward Wheatcroft 1,* , Henry P. Wynn 1,2, Victoria Volodina 2, Chris J. Dent 2,3 and Kristina Lygnerud 4


Citation: Wheatcroft, E.; Wynn, H.P.;
Volodina, V.; Dent, C.J.; Lygnerud, K.
Model-Based Contract Design for
Low Energy Waste Heat Contracts:
The Route to Pricing. Energies 2021,
14, 3614. https://doi.org/10.3390/
en14123614
Academic Editor: Antonio Rosato
Received: 22 May 2021
Accepted: 14 June 2021
Published: 17 June 2021
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
1 Department of Statistics, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK; H.Wynn@lse.ac.uk
2 Alan Turing Institute, 96 Euston Rd, London NW1 2DB, UK; vvolodina@turing.ac.uk (V.V.);
chris.dent@ed.ac.uk (C.J.D.)
3 School of Mathematics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9 3JZ, UK
4 IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute, 41133 Göteborg, Sweden; kristina.lygnerud@ivl.se
* Correspondence: e.d.wheatcroft@lse.ac.uk
Abstract: Urban Waste Heat Recovery, heat recovery from low-temperature urban sources such
as data centres and metro systems, has a great deal of potential in terms of meeting domestic and
commercial heat demands whilst significantly reducing carbon emissions. Urban sources of heat are
advantageous in that they tend to be close to areas of high heat demand and are therefore highly
suitable as inputs to existing and newly constructed district heating networks. This paper has two
main focuses. Firstly, the issue of efficiency in waste heat recovery is addressed with a focus on
Technical, Economic, Social, and Environmental (TESE) efficiencies, which we consider should be
given equal consideration. Secondly, we address the question of contractual efficiency and argue
that contracts should be underpinned by mathematical modelling. We then focus on the contractual
relationship between the owner of the waste heat and the district heating operator and consider the
question of waste heat pricing. We suggest a profit sharing approach in which the price per unit of
waste heat is allowed to vary according to important aspects such as demand and the electricity price.
A demonstration of this approach is presented using a simple model of a waste heat recovery system
that extracts heat from a data centre in Brunswick, Germany.
Keywords: district heating and cooling; urban waste heat recovery; data centres; contracts; low-
temperature; excess heat
1. Introduction
There has been an accumulation of experience with district heating and cooling over
the last ten years. Although countries like Sweden had already been at the forefront of
development in this area, it quickly developed more widely following the success of the EU
Celsius project and more specialized projects such as those focusing on low-temperature
waste heat [1,2]. These initiatives can be considered as part of, or spin offs from, the EU
Smart Cities programme [3] on the one hand and an increasing concern for future energy
production on the other.
Despite these advances, there can be no doubt that climate change is, or should be,
at the top of all political agendas. There has been a radical acceleration of interest in District
Heating and Cooling (DHC). The most direct reason is the advent of 2050 and 2030 zero
net carbon agendas, as represented by the EU Green Deal [4] and Energy Master Plan [5].
These include scenarios in which the banning of gas will make existing gas-driven DHC no
longer viable leading to a major switch towards heat pumps, almost entirely dependent on
renewable electricity. The catch-all phrase the “energy transition” is used to describe the
current era [6].
“Smart" programmes no longer deserve the name solely on technical grounds such
as the extensive use of digital technology. Objectives must be technical, economic, social
and environmental (TESE). Projects need to be technically efficient, economically viable,
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address social targets such as fuel poverty, and contribute to low or zero carbon and low
pollution. In addition even the smaller projects, and, in some sense, especially the smaller
district and community projects, may have multiple stakeholders. Although most DHC
projects are driven by cities, there is an increasing number of public/private partnerships.
There are two well-documented impediments to the development of DHC: the need
for very high standards of work on business cases to make projects bankable and the
design of resilient local contracts. A focus of this paper is on the latter and we argue that
contracts should be underpinned by modeling. Our message regarding this is simple: good
contracts, as with good business models, need to be based on modeling. The consideration
of multiple TESE objectives gives rise to a number of issues, covered by the paper: broader
definitions of efficiency than purely technical, choices of Key Performance Indicator (KPI)
for model inputs and outputs, different pricing models and the inclusion of sections in
contracts to cover both the short and long term dynamics of projects. The ideas of resilience
(robustness) against the vagaries of supply and demand, sometimes captured by scenarios,
and their need to be understood and embedded in contracts, is at least one good reason
for modelling.
Waste heat recovery initiatives usually require the involvement of multiple parties
with relationships formalised in contracts. Most notably, the waste heat producer and the
receiver are usually different stakeholders, each with their own objectives. On top of this,
there are often other stakeholders involved such as local authorities, housing developers
and consultants. Designing contracts can be a challenging and time-consuming process.
One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the process of designing “efficient" contracts
in waste heat recovery projects. The relationship between the waste heat owner and the
energy company is of utmost importance and a key question regards the price to be paid
for the waste heat. We present a profit sharing mechanism for determining the price of
waste heat in which profits are shared between the producer and the energy company.
The proportion of profit assigned to each party is then a matter for negotiation.
Profit-sharing should, in our opinion, be part of a more general ethos that contracts
should be model-based, that is should be attached to heat/energy models which are widely
used and widely available, but should also have economic, environmental and social
components. Although not completely satisfactory, the last two of these often appear as
constraints, for example achieving stated levels of carbon reduction and affordable prices
to avoid fuel poverty. We believe that, as well as providing a robust pricing formula, profit
sharing can be a conduit between this type of modeling and contracts.
The ideas in this paper come largely from the perspective of the Horizon 2020 EU-
funded project ReUseHeat which aims to demonstrate the use of low-temperature heat
sources as inputs to district heating networks [2]. The project involves four demonstrator
sites, with three extracting heat from a Metro station, a hospital, and a data center, respec-
tively and the other demonstrating a dashboard aimed at showing the benefits of waste heat
recovery. One of the aims of the project is to provide guidance regarding contract design in
low-temperature heat recovery and this work is a major aspect of the paper. The work has
also been carried out under the Managing Uncertainty in Government Modelling (MUGM)
project taking place at the Alan Turing Institute, London which aims to understand better
the role of uncertainty quantification in modelling [7].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe relevant background
methodologies. In Section 3, we define various types of efficiency and discuss their impor-
tance in the context of waste heat recovery projects. In Section 4, we discuss the importance
of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in contract design. In Section 5, we discuss the
various stakeholders of waste heat recovery. In Section 6, we define the profit sharing
mechanism and, in Section 7, we demonstrate it using a model based on heat recovery
from a data center. In Section 8, we discuss scenarios, giving a number of examples and
discussing their impact both on KPIs and on the profit-sharing mechanism. Section 9
presents our conclusions.
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2. Background Methodologies
In this section, we discuss traditional methodologies related to the treatment of techni-
cal, economic, social and environmental (TESE) features of infrastructure projects. We then
discuss each of these in terms of efficiency in Section 3.
2.1. Externalities and the Coase Theorem
It was recognized early in economics that the central parts of economic theory, par-
ticularly general equilibrium theory concerning supply and demand, were insufficient to
cover the full realities of economic life. Externalities cover effects, good or bad, which
are exterior to the main “equations". Negative externalities are very close to the military
concept of collateral damage covered under rather ancient approaches to the ethics of
war. These ideas of proportionality arise: roughly, collateral damage should not be greater
than is proportional in some sense to the main objective. In Economics, the modelling
of externalities was introduced by Ronald Coase in a theory which came to be known
as the Coase Theorem [8]. Put simply, the theory says that, if externalities are properly
measured and folded into transaction costs, the economic equilibrium is still possible.
Not surprisingly it is often studied as a way of modeling the relationship between the
public and private sectors, because the additional costs are often felt by the public at large.
Pollution is a good example [8].
2.2. Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)
Following on from the last section, we could say that CBA has been the principal
way to recognize the totality of externalities arising from, particularly major, civil projects:
roads, rail, air transport. It received early criticism because of its attempt to monitor all
aspects of a project. It has been criticized for a number of other reasons: (i) the difficulty of
pricing, establishing the value of the effect, including inflating the benefits, (ii) the failure to
assess the uncertainty aspects and the future consequences of such failure, (iii) the hiding of
trade-offs between the different effects. At the very least, CBA should encourage discussion
of trade-offs between what may be incommensurate effects, such as the value of an ancient
woodland versus a new motorway, in order to take a more multi-objective approach [9,10].
2.3. Social Value
Although over a hundred years old, the concept of social value has been rediscovered
over the last twenty years, [11,12]. In the UK, the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012
enshrined some of the ideas in law relating to public sector contracts. The idea is similar
to that of externalities and cost–benefit analysis. It tries to capture the effects of contracts
that may not be part of the main contracts, by building in a statutory duty to consider
particularly local communities which may be affected, and this recognition may take the
form of creating additional, even compensatory, actions. Examples would be funding a
community center or an environmental improvement. Social value is closely related to
Company Social Responsibility (CSR), Social Return on Investment (SRI) and Business
Ethics. If there is a strong message from the social value movement, it is that, unless com-
panies take their general responsibilities to society seriously, governments are likely to
build them into corporate governance rules, something which happened in the area of
risk [11–13].
2.4. Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) and the Circular Economy
Perhaps the most effective methodology for auditing the external effects of investment
has been Life Cycle Analysis (also Life Cycle Assessment, Life Cycle Inventory), which goes
back to near the start of the modern environmental movement. There are two basic ideas: (i)
a product, (operation, investment etc.) has a life cycle, (ii) there is an environmental impact
at every stage, from mining minerals which are used to make the product to disposal at
“end-of-life”. Initially concentrating on environmental, that is biological, impact it now
includes concepts such as carbon footprint, associated with climate change. A successful
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application led to the WEEE directives banning landfill at the end of the life of electrical
goods [14]. This led to improvements in component and material re-use.
In the way that old ideas are often given a boost by a change of title, the “circular
economy” is very similar to LCA but with perhaps a greater emphasis on completely closing
the “life-cycle loop”. An example of the failure to close the loop is in plastics for which a
large proportion still goes to landfill, despite the good intentions of manufacturers [15].
3. Efficiency
We are familiar with the notion of efficiency from everyday life. We might learn that
our car runs most efficiently at a speed of 50 km per hour, and that large cars are “gas
guzzlers” in heavy traffic. We might surmise that big racing boats are built to operate well
in the kind of winds which arise in races, but not so well in low winds. A small dinghy is
designed to pick up speed quickly even when the wind is light. Wind turbines are turned
off in high winds, implying they have zero efficiency in such circumstances.
From these everyday examples, we see two things: (i) efficiency must be clearly
defined. For example, for a car, this might be the number of kilometers from a liter of petrol
at 60 km per hour, and (ii) efficiency itself depends on other variables such as the design of
the car, the speed at which it is traveling etc. From this discussion, we see that efficiency E
is some kind of ratio E = YZ and that this ratio may depend on internal design variable θ
and exogenous (input) variables x.
3.1. TESE
Our initial task is to give one or more definitions of efficiency for each of our categories.
This initial separation gives each category the same moral status and we want to argue
against the kind of thinking which places one category as an externality. In an era in which
economic prerogatives can be said to dominate, one place this is found is in objectives such
as the maximization of profit subject to achieving environmental standards. Given that the
primary aim of many “green" projects is to reduce carbon emissions or reduce pollution,
the use of environmental standards as a constraint rather than as an objective in its own
right means that opportunities to make further progress in such areas might be missed. We,
therefore, need separate definitions for each category.
3.1.1. Technical and Productive Efficiency
The technical and productive efficiencies of a process both refer to the ratio of the
output and the input. Technical efficiency can be thought of as the ratio of actual and
potential output produced for some given fixed level of input, whilst productive efficiency
can be thought of as the ratio of actual and potential input required for some given level of
output [16,17].
In the context of heat recovery projects, when heat pumps are used, their technical
and productive efficiency are of utmost importance. The Coefficient of Performance (COP)
of a heat pump is the ratio of the units of heat provided and the units of electricity used
to supply it [18]. The electricity needed to provide a given number of units of heat is
closely related to productive efficiency and the heat provided by a given number of units
of electricity the technical efficiency. Both are governed by the COP. The key benefit of
waste heat recovery is that the COP is typically greater than one and therefore the number
of units of heat supplied is greater than the number that would be generated using the
electricity directly (electricity is usually considered 100 percent efficient in producing heat
and therefore one unit of heat is produced per unit of electricity).
The choice of heat pump is a key question in heat recovery projects. Heat demand
is highly seasonal and thus a decision often has to be made as to whether to supply
the baseload (i.e., demand that is present all year), the full heat demand, or something
in between. If the full heat demand is not supplied by waste heat, an alternative such
as a Combined Heat and Power (CHP) unit is required to meet the rest of the demand.
The seasonality of heat demand, therefore, creates a trade-off. If the heat pump is able
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to supply year-round demand for heat, it will have an unused capacity for much of the
year. On the other hand, a heat pump that is only able to supply the baseload may not
make full use of the waste heat available. It is also worth noting that seasonality in the
temperature of the waste heat will create seasonality in the COP. Generally, the bigger the
difference between the temperature of the waste heat and the supplied heat, the lower
the COP. The overall technical and productive efficiency may therefore be optimized by
reducing the heat provided in the winter months. This, of course, may be undesirable and
thus it may be useful to favor technical and productive efficiency subject to achieving other
types of efficiency.
A high COP is desirable in waste heat recovery projects and the values that can be
achieved have been investigated by a number of authors in the academic literature. Nyers,
for example, presents a system for the recovery of heat from wastewater and it is suggested
that a COP of around 6 may be possible [19]. Hepbasli et al. carry out a review of the
COP of heat pumps used alongside wastewater treatment processes and values ranging
from 1.77 to 10.63 are found, demonstrating the importance of local aspects in determining
efficiency [20]. Deymi-Dashtebayaz et al. assess the COP values of heat pumps used for
heat recovery from data centers and find that high values are possible, with the choice of
refrigerant being a key factor [21]. The COP of heat recovery from wastewater in a metro
station in Glasgow is investigated by Ninikas et al. and a time-averaged value of 2.5 is
estimated [22].
3.1.2. Economic (Pareto) Efficiency
In the context of microeconomics, Pareto efficiency is achieved when no action can
be taken to improve the position of any actor without negatively impacting another [23].
A corollary of Pareto efficiency is that the overall economic benefit is maximized. Consider,
for example, an action in which one actor’s economic benefit could be increased with a cost
of reducing another’s by some smaller amount. This situation would not be Pareto-efficient
because the former could simply compensate the latter for their loss.
3.1.3. Environmental and Social Efficiency
Traditionally, economics has dealt with social and environmental effects by considering
them ‘externalities’. The idea is that production often has negative environmental and
social effects. Environmental and social efficiency occurs when the overall cost to society is
assigned to the producer.
The now traditional way to build a social element into the more general economic
theory is with a welfare function [24]. This needs individual utilities to be combined in
some way to give a societal measure of welfare. It has the usual dichotomy between (i) the
raw utilitarian approach, that is maximize the average (total) welfare, and (ii) maximin:
maximizing the welfare of the worst off. Alongside these are general issues such as equity
(equality), social deprivation and social exclusion.
3.2. Contractual Efficiency
Contracts formalize relationships between parties, cementing rights and responsi-
bilities in a legally binding fashion. Negotiating and writing contracts, however, is a
time-consuming, and often costly, process. Hiring legal experts can be expensive and there
is an opportunity cost in preparing for and participating in negotiations. Some of these
costs can be significantly reduced when previously agreed contracts or specimen contracts
can be referred to. In general, the more detailed the contract, the higher the costs involved.
Contract theory considers the ‘completeness’ of a contract [25]. A contract is ‘complete’ if it
includes every possible eventuality, removing the need for disputes. It is widely accepted
that complete contracts are unattainable in practice and therefore contracts have varying
degrees of ‘incompleteness’. It is clear that there is a trade-off between the completeness
of a contract and the costs involved in negotiating it. This trade-off is nicely described by
Crocker and Reynolds [26] who argue that
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“Agents are confronted with a trade-off between the ex ante costs of crafting
more complete agreements and the ex post inefficiencies associated with less
exhaustive arrangements.”
If contracts are necessarily incomplete, it is inevitable that some eventualities will not
be covered. This is a risk to the involved parties because uncontracted events may lead to
disputes and unpredictable outcomes. In light of this, the parties must prioritize the most
important aspects of an arrangement. This usually means covering those eventualities that
pose the biggest risk, i.e., that have a high probability and/or a high cost. There is then
likely to be significant diminishing returns once the most important aspects are covered.
The above discussion applies to individual contractual arrangements but the argu-
ment can be extended to the wider context of a project in which multiple contractual
arrangements are required. Increasing the number of involved parties in a project usually
increases the number of contractual arrangements required and this comes at an increased
cost. The trade off one must consider is then the increased cost of including an extra partner
and the value in doing so. We consider a contractual arrangement to be efficient if it strikes
the right balance between the ‘completeness’ of the contract and the cost of negotiations.
Contractual efficiency in waste heat recovery is not well-covered in the academic
literature. However, the issue was considered by Lygnerud et al. who identify key factors
for achieving contractual efficiency [27]. These are listed and described below.
1. Ensure that all parties are incentivized to carry out their obligations and continue
with the arrangement.
2. Ensure that communication channels are kept open.
3. Clearly specify when renegotiation should take place.
4. Include mitigation clauses.
5. Keep the contract simple where possible.
In addition to the above, we suggest the following approaches to help achieve im-
proved contractual efficiency:
1. Focus on highest risk aspects first.
2. Achieve greater symmetry of information and communication between parties.
3. Understand the risk of excluding clauses.
4. Clarify the definitions of KPIs.
5. Carry out effective modeling before negotiation takes place.
6. Ensure that contracts are monitored.
7. Optimise design and operations.
8. Use standard contract templates, where possible.
9. Reduce the number of required contractual arrangements.
10. Build close relationships between partners to reduce incentives to gain an advantage
by entering into a dispute.
3.3. Contract Guarantees and Service Level Agreements
Several terms capture the inclusion of energy efficiency into contracts. Energy Perfor-
mance Contracts (EPC) are standard in areas such as the supply of energy to buildings.
Energy Efficiency is very closely related to this and the term ‘Efficiency Performance’
is used more widely. The most common form in which performance and efficiency are
written into contracts is guarantees, sometimes named ‘Service Level Agreements’ (SLA),
combined with scope for renegotiation in the case of failure to achieve the guaranteed, or a
new guaranteed, level. Insurance against failure may be mandated in some cases and the
technical term “efficacy insurance” is used to describe failure which may lead, for example,
to damage to a third party, such as the failure of a water sprinkler for a fire.
4. Contract Related KPIs
There is no escape from trade-offs between the different types of efficiencies. The most
economically efficient configuration may not be the most environmental or socially efficient
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if the lowest cost option produces high carbon emissions and/or pollution. The type of
heat pump that maximizes technical efficiency may not be the most economically efficient,
or even environmentally efficient, if the money saved from buying a less efficient heat pump
could be put to better use. Despite this, from a methodological point of view, we favor
approaches that retain a multi-objective flavor, rather than a reduction to a single objective
which is likely to be financial. Taking this approach is one reason for the importance of
clear specification, and understanding, of KPIs.
In general, we argue that important concerns related to efficiencies and resilience
should be represented in technical, economic, social and environmental KPIs and that
these KPIs should be represented in contracts. Effective modeling should underpin all of
these where possible. On the ReUseHeat project, KPIs from each of these four areas were
defined early on and are being monitored throughout the project. Technical KPIs include
values such as the Coefficient of Performance (COP) of the heat pump and primary energy
savings (kW/h). Financial KPIs such as the Return On Investment (ROI), Internal Rate
of Return (IRR) and the payback period are all considered to be important to the viability
of the projects. Other financial KPIs specific to heating are included such as the levelized
cost of heat. Environmental KPIs are considered to be of great importance and include,
for example, greenhouse gas emissions per unit of heat supplied (reducing this number is a
key aim in all cases). Social KPIs are more difficult to define and monitor but, in ReUseHeat,
include the degree of satisfaction among customers, comfort levels and attitudes expressed
on social media.
5. Stakeholders
Waste heat recovery projects often have a wide range of stakeholders, some of whom
are directly involved and others who are part of the wider community context. The former
category includes stakeholders such as the waste heat owner, the energy company and the
end-user. Here is a list for the latter category:
International. Due to climate change, every project on waste heat contributes to
international commitments. This may be legal, part of an involvement in a supply chain
or both.
National. Automatically, there are national stakeholders, for example in terms of
funding, taxation or national policy. An example of this would be those interested in
reducing fuel poverty.
Local and community. Again these arise automatically, for example in the planning
process as part of electoral democracy or via more informal local consultation. It is likely
that, as climate change action by government increases, the requirement to involve local
communities will increase and various forms of “deliberative democracy” may flourish.
A successful example of this is a dashboard developed as part of the ReUseHeat project
in Toulon, France, in which users are able to visualize the benefits of waste heat recovery
from seawater [28].
End-user. Although we are principally interested here in the immediate customer,
the end-user is part of the system and generates demand, and may be featured in social
objectives and objectives related to price. Care has to be taken to distinguish the end-user,
that is the tenant paying rent, the leaseholder, who owns a long lease but may also pay
the service charge which covers heating and cooling, and the owner/occupier. It is widely
acknowledged that the relationship with the end-user is critical, particularly because of
the newness of the systems, but also as part of general customer awareness and consumer
relations. This affects contracts because of service level agreements, customer charters and
so on.
6. Materials and Methods
By far, the most important contractual arrangement in waste heat recovery is between
the waste heat supplier and the stakeholder to whom the heat is supplied, the heat receiver.
The former may, for example, be a data centre, a metro operator, or a hospital such as those
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involved in the ReUseHeat project [2]. The latter may be a city, a Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV) set up specifically for providing DHC, or an energy company. Whilst there is often a
need for other contractual arrangements, it is useful to focus upon this relationship because
(i) a contract of this kind will always be necessary if the waste heat supplier and receiver
are different stakeholders, (ii) the success of the project usually hinges on this relationship
being maintained and (iii) this relationship presents novel challenges, not least the price
paid (if any) for the waste heat.
There are many examples of formulae for the price of waste heat and these vary in com-
plexity. In all cases, conditions for payment should be laid out clearly and unambiguously.
Some examples of pricing formulae are given below:
1. Waste heat is provided for free.
2. A fixed weekly/monthly/annual fee is paid subject to conditions on quality and
consistency of supply.
3. A fixed price per unit of heat is paid subject to temperature conditions.
4. A combination of fixed and variable payments are made.
5. Heat is purchased only under certain seasonal or weather conditions (these conditions
should be clearly and unambiguously laid out).
A number of papers have considered the issue of pricing in waste heat contracts.
Wynn, Wheatcroft and Lygnerud present the results of a set of interviews with stakeholders,
in which some of the discussion focused on pricing [29]. One German waste heat owner
revealed that the price of waste heat is based on a calculation of factors such as heat flow
and temperature levels. Two Swedish waste heat owners stated that they were given a
price list from the DH Company. One example in which the price list is made public is that
of the Finnish energy company Fortum which publishes waste heat purchase prices for its
operations in parts of Finland. The prices depend on both the weather and on whether the
heat is sold to the supply or the return side of the network [30]. According to Wahlroos
et al., DH network operators tend to vary the price according to the outside temperature on
the basis that, when the outside temperature is high, there is lower demand for heat [31].
A dynamic approach to waste heat pricing in which the price depends on end-user
demand is suggested by Pärssinen, with the argument that, when demand is high, the price
should be high and vice versa [32]. Syri et al. suggest a marginal cost-based approach to
pricing in which the supplier is paid the marginal cost of alternative sources of heat with a
premium subtracted to account for the energy company’s costs [30]. The price of waste
heat is, therefore, dependent on the cost of producing heat from other technologies which
are subject to variations in factors such as supply and demand. This approach is taken by
Pärssinen et al. in their investment analysis in which they argue that pricing of waste heat
is a crucial factor in terms of the profitability of waste heat recovery projects [32].
In this section, we propose a simple profit-sharing mechanism for determining the
price of waste heat, in which, during negotiations, both parties agree to receive a fixed
proportion of the overall profit from the waste heat recovery. The price per unit of waste
heat is then the mechanism by which this profit sharing is achieved. Here, we describe
the profit-sharing mechanism, discuss its advantages, and provide a simple example to
demonstrate how it works in practice.
Over a given period of time, let Pro fhs and Pro fec be the net profit from the waste heat
recovery for the heat supplier and the energy company, respectively (noting that these can




Pro fhs + Pro fec
. (1)
The values of Pro fhs and Pro fec are determined by the following quantities:
Pe-Price paid by the end-user per unit of heat.
Pw-Price paid by the energy company to the waste heat supplier per unit of waste heat.
C-Coefficient of performance of the heat pump.
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D-Units of end-user demand supplied by the waste heat.
E-Price per unit of electricity for running the heat pump.
Fec-Fixed costs for the energy company.
Vec-Cost per unit of waste heat for the energy company (excluding the price of waste heat
and electricity).
Fhs-Fixed costs for the heat supplier.
Vhs-Cost to the heat supplier per unit of waste heat supplied.
Chs-Value of cooling per unit of waste heat supplied by the waste heat supplier.
The overall profit for the energy company is determined by the following Equation:
Pro fec = D(Pe− Pw−Vhs)− (D/C)E− Fec. (2)
The first term in the formula represents the net gain from recovering heat and sup-
plying it to the end-user, excluding the cost of electricity. The second term reflects the cost
of the electricity required to power the heat pump, whilst the third term represents fixed
costs that do not depend on the number of units supplied. The overall profit for the heat
supplier is determined by
Pro fhs = (Pw + Chs −Vhs)D− Fhs. (3)
The first term represents the net gain from units of waste heat sold, whilst the second
represents its fixed costs. Note that, for both parties, the profit depends directly on Pw.
Here, we propose that a fixed α is agreed in contract negotiations and the price of waste
heat Pw is adjusted to ensure this value is satisfied. To obtain an expression for the price of
















The equation is, in fact, intuitive since the price of waste heat is simply a weighted
average of the non-adjusted profit (i.e., setting Pw to zero) of the energy company and that
of the waste heat provider.
6.1. Profit Sharing and Contract Negotiations
The profit-sharing mechanism offers a simple approach to the pricing element of
contract negotiation. The two parties must simply agree to the pricing formula and
negotiate the value of α. In practice, the agreed value of α will usually depend on the
negotiating positions of the two parties. For example, if the energy company is in contact
with another potential heat source owner, this may increase their negotiating power and
they may be able to reduce α and therefore the cost it pays for waste heat. The parties may
also negotiate on the basis of different levels of risk. If one party pays for the infrastructure,
they may argue that their risk is higher and therefore they should receive a greater reward
in return. Simple adjustments to the approach may also be made. For example, if the
overall profit Pro fhs + Pro fec becomes negative, under the profit-sharing mechanism the
value of Pw will also be negative, requiring the heat supplier to pay the energy company
rather than vice versa. To avoid such a situation, the heat supplier might negotiate a ‘floor’
on the price. The results of simple modelling can be brought into negotiations, providing
clear estimates of the influence of different values of α in different scenarios.
6.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Profit Sharing
There are a number of advantages to the profit-sharing mechanism. Firstly, the ap-
proach provides robustness with respect to different scenarios. Consider, for example,
a scenario in which subsidies are introduced for electricity used to power heat pumps for
waste heat recovery. Given this sudden improvement in the profitability of the heat recov-
ery, the heat supplier may demand a renegotiation for the price of waste heat, such that they
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receive a proportion of the increased financial benefit. Under the profit-sharing mechanism,
however, the price of waste heat is automatically adjusted upwards to account for this
change. In an alternative scenario in which competition from other technologies forces the
energy company to lower its price to the end-user, the mechanism would automatically
adjust the price of waste heat downwards, sharing the cost between the two parties.
A disadvantage of the mechanism is that, for competitive reasons, one or more parties
may be unwilling to disclose the financial information needed for the pricing formula.
Agreement to use this approach, therefore, requires a high-level of transparency.
7. Results
We consider the use of a simple model to demonstrate the profit-sharing mechanism.
The model, details of which can be found in Appendix A, is built in GNU MathProg and
represents a waste heat recovery system from a data center loosely based on a system
under construction in Brunswick, Germany, which is a demonstrator site of the ReUseHeat
project [2]. The data center will supply waste heat via a heat pump to a newly constructed
district containing 400 housing units and a number of commercial units. The district will
also be connected to the existing city-wide district heating network which is powered using
a gas-fired combined heat and power (CHP) unit. Since the CHP is close to capacity for
meeting current demand in the city, its capacity will need to be upgraded at a fixed cost.
In Brunswick, the capacity of the heat pump has been chosen to meet only the baseload
heat demand of the new district (a demand that is present all year such as hot water). Here,
however, we consider a case in which a larger capacity heat pump is to be installed and is
therefore also capable of meeting a proportion of seasonal demand. We also assume that
the existing CHP is unable to provide the entire heat demand throughout the year. The size
of the heat pump places a natural upper bound on the number of units of waste heat that
can be supplied by the data center. We define a lower bound such that a minimum number
of units must be supplied by the data center (this provides security to the data center and
may be negotiated in the contract). We define demand profiles for each of the four seasons
(Spring, Summer, Autumn and Winter), in which days are divided into two different time
slices (day and night). We, therefore, assume that each time slice in each season (referred to
as a ‘time segment’) has the same level of demand. Each time segment then has its own
value of Pw which depends on α. The model optimizes the proportion of end-user heat to
be supplied by each source (data center or CHP), with respect to the energy company’s
overall costs of supplying it for each time segment. Since α itself impacts the costs of the
energy company, an optimization process is performed for each considered value of α
such that its value is taken into account during the process. This means that the value of α
may impact the number of units of waste heat supplied by the data center. Details of the
parameters for the profit-sharing mechanism are given in Table 1.










The effect of α on Pw is demonstrated in Figure 1. As expected, as α is increased,
the data center receives a higher price per unit of waste heat Pw since it is entitled to
a larger proportion of the overall profit. Differences between seasons are explained by
variations in the profit margin of the energy company. Since it is assumed that the fixed
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costs are evenly spread over the lifetime of the infrastructure, during the summer months
the fixed costs per unit of end-user heat ( FecD ) are higher than for the other seasons, reducing
the profit margin of the energy company and therefore the price Pw. Note how, for most
time segments, the value of Pw against α is not a straight line. This is because there is
a threshold of α at which it becomes cheaper for the energy company to switch from
using heat from the data center to heat from the CHP. To demonstrate the effect of this,
the number of units of end-user heat supplied by the data center and the CHP for each
time segment are shown for two values of α in Figure 2. When α = 0, it is cheaper for the
energy company to purchase heat from the data center whilst, for α = 0.3, it is cheaper to
use the entire available capacity of the CHP first. This demonstrates that, in some cases, it
may be beneficial for the heat supplier to agree to a lower value of α but sell more units of
waste heat as a result.
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Figure 1. Price per unit of waste heat Pw as a function of α for each time segment.
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Figure 2. Units of end-user heat demand supplied by the data centre (a,c) and the CHP (b,d) in each
time segment for α = 0.3 (upper panels) and α = 0 (lower panels). Red dashed lines denote the
capacity constraints of each technology.
Figure 2. Units of end-user heat demand supplied by the data centre (a,c) and the CHP (b,d) in each
time segment for α = 0.3 (upper panels) and α = 0 (lower panels). Red dashed lines denote the
capacity constraints of each technology.
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8. Contract-Related Scenarios in Heat Recovery
It is useful to think of risk both in terms of large-scale scenarios and smaller-scale
variations. The former is particularly relevant to waste heat recovery due to the fact that
it is a relatively immature technology with little or no regulatory framework (and thus
various scenarios as to how a framework might develop can be considered). There is
also significant uncertainty regarding the extent to which governments will prioritize heat
recovery for incentives and tax breaks. Scenarios can usually be assumed to be driven by
external events such that the stakeholders can only react rather than control them.
Scenarios can have a significant impact on TESE efficiencies and, consequently, on con-
tractual efficiency. The impacts of scenarios on heat recovery efficiencies can be positive or
negative and it is useful to consider both in the context of waste heat pricing. Under many
pricing schemes, contractual efficiency may be lost if there is a significant change in circum-
stances. The profit sharing mechanism, however, allows contracts to be resilient to many of
these changes. Below, we define a number of scenarios for heat recovery and discuss how
these relate to both the profit-sharing mechanism and to KPIs (denoted in italics).
1. Combined Heat and Power (CHP) phased out: CHP units are often used either to
provide the proportion of heat not supplied by the heat recovery or as a backup
supply. In this scenario, an alternative supply would need to cover the shortfall and
this might be solved by ramping up waste heat recovery. Under the profit-sharing
mechanism, economies of scale will increase the price of waste heat and the cost per
unit of end-user heat. There is also likely to be a reduction in CO2 emissions per unit
of heat supplied.
2. Increased insulation in buildings: This would reduce demand which, in turn, may
reduce economies of scale. Under the profit-sharing mechanism, the cost per unit of
end-user heat would therefore increase and, consequently, the price per unit of waste
heat would decrease.
3. Significantly increased average temperatures due to climate change: This would likely
reduce heat demand and therefore reduce economies of scale, increasing the cost per
unit of end-user heat and reducing the price of waste heat.
4. Government subsidies for heat storage: This policy would aim to make it financially
beneficial to invest in heat storage which would allow the heat pump to supply a
greater proportion of end-user demand (due to reductions in the effect of seasonality).
This would reduce the cost per unit of end-user heat and, since the profit is shared
with the waste heat supplier, would increase the price of waste heat.
5. Change in law obligating waste heat owners to supply waste heat for free: This would
remove the need for the energy company to pay the waste heat supplier and the
profit-sharing mechanism would no longer be needed. This would reduce the cost
per unit of end-user heat but increase the cooling costs for the waste heat supplier
(if applicable).
6. Government support for alternative technologies (e.g., heat pumps, solar panels):
If governments decide to invest in alternative sources such as solar and small scale
air or ground source heat pumps, this may reduce demand for district heating and
reduce economies of scale, increasing the cost per unit of end-user heat. Under the
profit-sharing mechanism, this would reduce the price per unit of waste heat.
7. Subsidised electricity for heat pumps: This would reduce the cost per unit of end-user
heat, increasing profits for the energy company which would result in an increase in
the price of waste heat under the profit-sharing mechanism. If production is ramped
up, this may lead to a reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of heat supplied as a lower
proportion of heat demand is supplied by other sources such as CHP.
9. Conclusions
The paper makes the case for an emphasis on modeling as part of contract design for
waste heat recovery projects. Although often small in the context of energy infrastructure
development, waste heat recovery is relatively new and is rapidly increasing in importance.
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Waste heat recovery has a number of special features which need to be taken into account.
Complexities include the differing properties of different waste heat source, connection to
existing heat networks, multiple stakeholders (insofar as they are increasingly community-
based projects) and fluctuating public-private funding sources. After introductory sections
giving a relevant background in contract-design, the paper focuses on the key issue of
pricing. The newness of these contracts means that we are still in a period in which it
is hard to establish standardized contracts. Pricing systems range from the waste heat
being supplied for free to ambitious plans to establish a proper market in waste heat. This
work can be seen as providing a framework in which, via a modelling core, schemes can
be designed for sharing profits between the waste heat supplier and the purchaser. Our
case study uses realistic KPIs for inputs and outputs and internal parameters based on the
Brunswick demonstrator in the EU ReUseHeat project. One of the advantages of having a
modeling platform is the ability to design contracts that are resilient to the local variation
of inputs and, increasingly importantly, to more global scenarios driven by national and
international decisions taken along the road to achieving 2050 net-zero carbon objectives.
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Appendix A. Heat Model Specification
The energy model presented in Section 7 is written in GNU MathProg, (Boston, MA.,
USA) [33] and is largely based on an implementation in OSeMOSYS (Open Source Energy
Modelling System) [34]. The model computes the units of heat to be supplied by the CHP
unit and the heat pump to minimise the cost to the energy company of meeting the demand
in each time segment. This then determines the level of demand supplied by the heat pump
and feeds into the profit sharing mechanism.
Define the following sets
• Time slices T , index t, elements {1...nT}. Time slices correspond to the division of
calendar days. In our case, we divide each one into ‘day’ and ‘night’.
• Seasons S , index s, elements {1...nS}. We consider 4 seasons: Spring, Summer, Au-
tumn and Winter.
• Heat supply technologies U , index u, elements {1...nU}. In our example, u = 1 and
u = 2 correspond to the Heat Pump and CHP, respectively.
Here, nS = 4 and nT = 2 such that there are a total of 8 time segments. It is assumed
that each day within each season and time slice has the same level of demand, e.g., each
winter night is treated the same.
We have the following variables:
[supply]stu: heat supply from technology u (MW).
[price_waste]st: total price of waste heat paid by the energy company to the waste heat
supplier in season s, time slice t (AC).
[TVC]st: total variable costs in season s and time slice t (AC).
[TFC]st: total fixed costs in season s and time slice t (AC).
[TC]st: total cost of supplying the end-user heat in season s and time slice t (AC).
We have the following parameters:
ndayss : number of days in season s.
nhourst : number of hours in time slice t.
[dem]st: demand in season s, time slice t, (MW).
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supply−u : minimum supply from technology u, (MW).
supply+u : maximum supply from technology u (MW)
[price_heat]st: price of heat paid by the end-user in season s, time slice t (AC/MW).
[val_cooling]st: value of cooling in season s, time slice t (AC/MW).
[fixed_cost]stu: fixed costs for the energy company associated with technology u in season
s and time slice t (AC).
[var_cost]stu: variable cost per unit of heat supply from technology u in season s and time
slice t (AC/MW).
[fixed_costHS]st: fixed costs for the waste heat supplier in season s and time slice t (AC).
[var_costHS]st: variable cost per unit for the waste heat supplier in season s and time slice
t (AC/MW).
α: value of α in the profit sharing mechanism.
The model is defined by the following equations:
[price_waste]st = α
(




[val_cooling]st[supply]st1 − [var_costHS]st[supply]st1 − [fixed_costHS]st
) (A1)
[TVC]st = [price_waste]st + [supply]st1[var_cost]st1 + [supply]st2[var_cost]st2 (A2)
[TFC]st = [fixed_cost]st1 + [fixed_cost]st2 (A3)
[TC]st = [TVC]st + [TFC]st. (A4)
The objective function to be minimised is
∑
st
ndayss nhoursst [TC]st (A5)
subject to the following constraints:
[dem]st = ∑u[supply]stu
[supply]−u ≤ [supply]stu ≤ [supply]+u .
The former constraint represents the Power balance and the latter ensures that the
minimum and maximum allowed level of supply for each technology is maintained.
It is important to note that modelling should take into account all affected income
streams for the energy company. For example, if the heat from the data centre replaces
existing supply from the CHP unit, this will reduce the output from the CHP, and therefore
may reduce economies of scale, increasing the cost per unit of supplying the rest of the city.
This increase in costs should be included in the optimisation function. In our case, heat
from the data centre is used to supply a newly constructed area of the city and therefore,
rather than supply being switched from the CHP to the data centre, the heat demand is
newly created. It is assumed here that the CHP is currently running at capacity and that an
increase in capacity is required to supply the new area (at a fixed cost). Whilst there are
economies of scale associated with increasing the number of CHP-supplied units to the
new area (since the fixed cost is spread over more units), this does not affect the cost of
supplying the rest of the city and therefore there is no need to include it in the optimisation
function. We are aware of the importance of linking models such as ours to larger city
wide or regional models and eventually national energy models but our objective is here is
to increase the attractiveness of local contracts as prerequisites: effective components in
larger systems.
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